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Philosophy Among and in the Wake of the Reformers: Luther, Melanchthon, Zwingli, 
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The most influential figures of the Protestant Reformation were not only spiritual 
leaders but also academically educated theologians. Martin Luther (1483-1546), Ulrich 
Zwingli (1484-1531), Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560), and John Calvin (1509-64) 
were raised in the late medieval world and studied according to the medieval curriculum, 
which was based on Aristotelian philosophy. Although during the Reformation their 
main interests were in theological issues, all of them commented in various ways on 
philosophy in general and philosophical doctrines in particular. They also adopted 
philosophical theories that served their theological thinking. Also, Melanchthon was an 
active writer of philosophical treatises. Finally, their impact on the way philosophy was 
practiced in the Protestant countries was significant. 
 
One can approach a late medieval theologian's relationship to philosophy in terms of 
three important themes. These themes, rather than a separate discussion of individual 
Reformers, will serve in what follows as a guide through the complex nest of questions 
relating to the Reformers' relationship to philosophy. 
 Firstly, there is the question of the theologian's relationship to his philosophical context. 
This includes questions about the continuity and discontinuity of the Reformers' 
thinking with their late medieval Aristotelian education. Secondly, there are the 
meanings and nuances that the Reformers ascribed to the word “philosophy” in their 
discourses. These are often negative ones. This theme also includes the Reformers' 
expressed views on the relationship between philosophy and theology, and their ideas 
about the relevance of reason and philosophy to gaining knowledge of God. Thirdly, it 
is interesting to examine how the Reformers discussed specific philosophical questions 
as well as the positions they held in philosophical matters.
3 
The Philosophical Contexts of the Reformers 
 
 
A division between different schools of philosophy and theology dominated the 
teaching in early 16th universities. Therefore it has been customary to refer to these 
schools as one of the most important philosophical contexts of the Reformers. However, 
recent scholarship has questioned the traditional ways to define the characteristics of the 
schools. The confusion in older scholarship has originated from the fact that the names 
of the schools were related to 13th and 14th century authorities. Thomists, Scotist and 
Albertists were commonly called via antiqua, whereas via moderna “the Moderns” 
referring to adherence to the 14th century authors later than John Duns Scotus. Despite 
the naming, the division between the “ways” developed during the 15th century and 
there is no clear doctrinal continuity between 15th century schools and their 13th and 
14th century authorities. (Hoenen 2003: 11-12; 19.) 
 
There was also no doctrinal uniformity inside the individual schools; the idea of a 
particular method, especially concerning the interpretation of Aristotle, was more 
formative for school identity. Even the method was applied variously within each 
school tradition. In practice, the term “way” indicated the authorities used throughout a 
particular textbook or as a basis for teaching in a particular university context. For 
understanding the philosophical context of the Reformers it is, therefore, necessary to 
bear in mind that the teaching of philosophy according to the via antiqua was usually 
based on the works of either Thomas of Aquinas (the Thomists), John Duns Scotus (the 
Scotists), or Albert the Great (the Albertists), or some other authors who considered 
themselves as followers of these. Accordingly, the teaching of the via moderna 
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followed mainly such authors as John Buridan, Marsilius of Inghen, William Ockham, 
Peter of Ailly or Gregory of Rimini. (Hoenen 2003: 11-13.) 
 
Since the beginning of modern historical studies in the late 19th century, Luther's 
relationship to his philosophical context has aroused interest. The earliest approaches 
identified a strong distinction between philosophy and theology in Luther's polemics 
against scholastic philosophy. However, the more positive tones regarding philosophy 
in his later writings were also noted and explained by the withdrawal of evangelical 
theology from scholasticism. (On the early approaches of Nitzsch and Bahlow, see 
Dieter 2001: 1; Kopperi 1997: 93 fn. 12.) Later scholars have often criticized the 
simplistic search of the influences from late medieval philosophy in Luther's thinking, 
and instead have called for a study of Luther's theology that takes seriously both the 
continuities and discontinuities between Luther and his late medieval philosophical 
context (Baur 1993: 14; White 1994: 84; Dieter 2001: 23-28). 
 
Luther's biographers have always noted that he had a solid philosophical training 
according to the via moderna school at the University of Erfurt. Indeed, the descriptions 
of some biographers have for a long time remained the most comprehensive accounts of 
Luther's immediate philosophical context (see Scheel 1921: 174-234; Brecht 1981: 42-
53). Despite the availability of the sources of Luther's known philosophy teachers in 
Erfurt, Jodocus Trufetter of Eisenach and Bartholomaeus Arnoldi of Usingen, the 
philosophy of the via moderna in Erfurt has largely remained unexamined by modern 
scholarship. (For a significant exception, see Lalla 2003.)  
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The via moderna in Erfurt has often been inaptly designated as “Ockhamism.” In 
addition to Ockham, several other authorities such as John Buridan, Gregory of Rimini, 
Peter of Ailly, and Gabriel Biel were frequently followed. In opposition to the strict 
adherence to particular authorities by the Thomists and Scotists of the via antiqua, 
Trutfetter had a relatively permissive attitude towards rival school positions. For 
example, concerning the traditionally dividing question whether there are universals in 
the extramental world Trutfetter answered negatively and affirmed as the position of his 
nominalist school that universality is a property of words or concepts, and not of the 
things which words and concepts signify. According to him, Scotist and Thomist views 
can be still tolerated, if they do not posit the real existence of universal natures in the 
extramental world. This includes for Trutfetter a Scotist view, according to which there 
is an objective principle in a singular substance of its being known as a universal nature, 
which resides in the thing prior to any operation of the intellect. Similarily, Trutfetter 
did not object the Thomist view, which posited universal natures in the things of the 
extramental world, which were not really or formally distinct from the things 
themselves, but only by rational distinction as the result of the intellect's operation 
(Kärkkäinen 2009: 428-9; 431-2). During his studies as an Augustinian friar in Erfurt, 
Luther still referred mainly to the authorities of the via moderna instead of the standard 
theologian of his own order, Giles of Rome (Kärkkäinen 2010: 475-6). 
 
Among the Reformers discussed in this chapter, the most active in philosophy was 
undoubtedly Philip Melanchthon. Through his many published textbooks he earned the 
title Teacher of Germany, and not least because of his several textbooks on logic and 
natural philosophy. Whereas Luther did not engage himself in the teaching of 
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philosophy, Melanchthon carried the main responsibility of the content of philosophy 
teaching in the University of Wittenberg during the early years of the Reformation. 
 
Like Luther, Melanchthon had a solid late medieval education in philosophy, even 
though he was involved in the circle of leading German humanists since his early years. 
If Luther was educated in a university exclusively representing the via moderna, 
Melanchthon's academic background was less uniform. He began his studies in the arts 
faculty of the University of Heidelberg, but later moved to Tübingen, from where he 
was invited, as a brilliant young Greekist, to Wittenberg. In Tübingen, the faculties of 
theology and arts had since the founding of the university been officially divided into 
two parts, one being the Thomist-Scotist via antiqua and the other the via moderna. 
According to his own later memories as well as his biographer Joachim Camerarius, 
Melanchthon followed in Tübingen the via moderna school, but the importance of this 
in the genesis of his philosophical insights has proved difficult to evaluate (Frank 1995: 
33-5). 
 
Already during his Tübingen years Melanchthon was deeply involved in the study of 
Aristotle from a humanist point of view. The most conspicuous sign of this was the 
project to publish a new edition of Aristotle's works according to the humanist 
principles in which Melanchthon participated. During his first years in Wittenberg 
Melanchthon still seems to have been engaged in this project, but soon abandoned it in 
the midst of the growing criticism of Aristotle. Through to his close contacts with the 
leading humanists of his time, Melanchthon was probably exposed to Renaissance 
Platonism, although there is little evidence of this aspect in his philosophical thought 
(Frank 1995: 17; 26). 
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Like other early reformers, Zwingli, too, was educated in a manner in which humanism 
complemented his basic training in late medieval school philosophy and theology. 
Unlike the Wittenberg reformers, Zwingli acquired his scholastic training in a strictly 
Scotist context. According to Daniel Bolliger, the Scotist influences had far-reaching 
consequences in Zwingli's thinking, extending to his theological disagreements with the 
Wittenberg reformers on the nature of the Eucharist and Christology, as will be seen 
below (Bolliger 2003). 
 
Very little is known about Zwingli's studies at the universities of Vienna and Basel. It is 
most probable that his education was Scotist, and there are no clear indications of a 
Thomist influence as some scholars have suggested. His numerous comments on the 
works of Scotist authors (Duns Scotus himself, Stephen Brulefer, and Conrad 
Summenhart) reveal a close acquaintance with Scotist philosophy and theology, which 
most likely dates back to his years as a student of theology and his early years as a 
humanist and Reformer (Bolliger 2003, 495-7).  
 
Crucial figures in Zwingli's introduction to contemporary Scotism seem to have been 
Thomas Wyttenbach and Antonius Beck, both teachers of the University of Basel after 
1506. Wyttenbach had studied in Tübingen under Scotists Conrad Summenhart and 
Paul Scriptoris, the latter having been a student of Stephen Brulefer, one of the leading 
Scotists of his time. In the early sixteenth-century Scotism was a strong force in 
southwest Germany, especially because of the Franciscan theologians, many of whom 
were Zwingli's close colleagues. Regarding Zwingli's later development, it is worth 
noting that some of the leading figures of southwest German Scotism, such as Brulefer 
8 
and Scriptoris, strongly advocated church reforms along Scotist lines. To a certain 
degree the same applies to Summenhart and Wyttenbach, although their concerns were 
more about social-ethical and spiritual issues than actual church reforms (Bolliger 2003, 
501-4). 
 
In comparison with Luther, Melanchthon, and Zwingli, the role of late medieval 
philosophy in Calvin's education is more difficult to determine. There has been a long 
dispute among scholars over the influence of the Scottish philosopher and theologian 
John Mair (1467/68-1550) on the young Calvin. It is a known fact that Calvin studied 
philosophy in the college of Montaigu at the University of Paris during the 1520s. There, 
Calvin might have attended Mair's lectures on philosophy, but no conclusive evidence 
exists concerning whether Mair taught in Paris during Calvin's time there. More 
plausible would be to suggest that Calvin had received his basic education in philosophy 
from teachers of the late via moderna school where Mair was a respected authority, but 
even this thesis has not been properly examined and sources on the young Calvin are 
scarce. (Lane 1999, 16-25; on Mair's theology and philosophy, see Slotemaker & Witt 
forthcoming.) 
 
The Reformers' views on Philosophy, Natural Theology and Philosophers 
 
Luther's earliest known critical comments on philosophers as “doubters full of opinions” 
date already from the time of his theology studies in Erfurt:  
 
“Although I have held that the spoils of philosophy are not to be utterly rejected insofar 
as they are suitable to the sacred matters of theology … The world is full of 
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Chrysippuses, yes even Chimeras and Hydras! The poets could fashion nothing more 
expressive and humorous to ridicule the quarrels, battles, and sects of the philosophers, 
than such monsters as these: laughable  indeed, yet also appropriate and most acute in 
their witty pungency. Therefore, love sound, faithful, and pure authors, or at least (if 
necessary it must be so) join them to you in secular familiarity, the philosophers I mean, 
that is to say, the doubters full of opinions” (Luther 2009, 258 trans. by Philipp 
Rosemann in Rosemann 2007, 179). 
 
 Although placed in a text strongly colored by humanist language, it echoes similar 
comments found among the via moderna (Kärkkäinen 2010, 477).  However, during his 
early years in Wittenberg Luther used the Aristotelian theory of motion in a positive 
manner as a tool for articulating a central theme of his theology: the justification of the 
sinner. A key idea for Luther was a succession of existence of two contrary attributes in 
one human subject. According to Ockham, human being is progressing from morally 
good to better in a series of successive states, where first one possesses attributes of 
being righteous (iustus) to a degree a and not-righteous to the degree b and then not-
righteous to the degree a and righteous to the degree b. Luther applied the principle to 
total sinfulness and total righteousness, which according to him are not successive states, 
but instead co-exist in the human being during her spiritual movement towards 
becoming righteous. In one sense they are mutually exclusive attributes, but at the same 
time they exist as partial realities: the one waxing and the other waning. One must note 
that here Luther made use of an idea found in Ockham, but applied it in a different way. 
Luther even considered the whole of creation as being in motion, and examined the 
relationships between the persons of the Trinity as analogous to physical movement but 
did not develop the idea into a philosophical theory of being (Dieter 2001: 344-5; 375-
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7). At the same time Luther applied Aristotle's theory of knowledge to theology, 
because he considered the union between Christ and believer as analogous to the 
Aristotelian idea of the non-substantial unity of the intellect with the intelligible. As 
intellect and its object are one in the act of intellection, so are Christ and Christian 
united in the word of the Gospel and in faith (Dieter 2001: 260-75). Moreover, during 
the same years Luther theologically applied the concept of synderesis, which can be 
found in the natural philosophy of his teacher Trutfetter. Trutfetter had presented 
synderesis, which was traditionally conceived as unerring faculty closely related to the 
conscience, as both voluntary and intellectual power leading human being to know and 
will the good in general, although the conscience may lead the human being to err in the 
particular applications of the general good. Luther adopted the twofold nature of the 
synderesis, and described synderesis of the will including a desire to be saved, but 
considered it active also when one follows one's distorted selfish will against God's will 
(Kärkkäinen 2012: 891-2). 
 
The classic case where Luther takes a definite stance on philosophical issues and 
philosophers is the Heidelberg disputation (1518). Although the disputation as a whole 
has a theological focus, its latter part – 12 of a total of 40 theses – discusses philosophy. 
(On the disputation, see Dieter 2001.) Luther argues that Aristotle's philosophy, if 
understood in its own right, is futile and harmful to theology and even to understanding 
questions of natural philosophy. This attack on philosophy is clearly directed at 
Aristotle's own texts, and in a humanist manner Luther tries the find the Philosopher's 
own voice without referring to later interpreters. To validate his argument, Luther 
presents Aristotle's views of the mortality of the soul and the eternity of the world, 
which had both caused trouble for generations of Muslim, Jewish, and Christian 
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philosophers. Furthermore, Luther presents the principles of Aristotle's physics in a way 
that lead to the impossibility of a real distinction between matter and form. Furthermore, 
Luther denies that Aristotle had a genuine concept of eternity, and interprets the relevant 
expressions to mean that something is eternal only from a certain point of view, but in 
reality is transient, which for Luther contradicts the Christian view of the eternity of 
God and the immortality of  human intellectual soul (Dieter 2001: 627-8). 
 
Luther's repudiation of philosophy in the Heidelberg disputation was targeted 
specifically at Aristotle, and from that viewpoint he considered some other ancient 
philosophers more positively. These included Plato's doctrines of ideas and the theory of 
participation, which Luther judged to be better tools for natural philosophy because of 
their compatibility with Christian understanding of creation. Scholars have noted that 
Luther's early theology contained expressions that can be considered Platonist in some 
sense, and that he uses Plato in the elucidation of some theological ideas. However, only 
in the Heidelberg disputation does Luther clearly contrast Aristotle and Plato to the 
favor of the latter, together with other ancient philosophers criticized by Aristotle. In his 
later works Luther continues to refer to Plato in positive terms, although with growing 
criticism towards the speculative  nature of Plato's philosophy and without plans to 
develop a Christian philosophy on a Platonist basis (Kopperi 1997: 225-31).  
 
Nevertheless, at the time of the Heidelberg disputation Luther was not completely 
dissociated from his early Aristotelian education. According to Dieter, the view of 
Aristotle's philosophy dating back to Ockham was constitutive for his rejection of 
Aristotle, although Luther never explicitly refers to Ockham or other late medieval 
authors in his interpretations of Aristotle's. Therefore, even when Luther turned against 
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the philosophy of Aristotle, it was, at least partially, the Aristotle of Ockham and his 
followers that he rejected. The crucial points of his inherited interpretation were the 
rejection of a real distinction between form and matter, and between components of 
movement (mover, movement, and end of movement) in physical movement  (Dieter 
2001: 343; 630).  
 
Following the Heidelberg disputation Luther continued to attack Aristotelian philosophy, 
which eventually contributed to the reforms of the curriculum of the University of 
Wittenberg where the teaching of Aristotelian philosophy was discontinued in the early 
1520s. The Organon (along with Rhetoric and Poetics) found Luther's approval even 
during these years, but he considered Physics, Metaphysics, Nicomachean Ethics, and 
On the Soul as the worst of the Philosopher's works.  In his treatise Address to the 
Christian Nobility of the German Nation (1520), Luther demands the removal of these 
books written by the ”blind pagan” Aristotle. He especially highlights the content of the 
Ethics as contrary to the Christian doctrine of virtues, as well as the idea of the mortality 
of the human soul in De anima,. However, it has been claimed that when Aristotle again 
gained more acceptance in the university through reforms initiated by Melanchthon, a 
theological basis for the more positive attitude towards philosophy in general and 
Aristotle in particular was laid in Luther's sharp distinction between the domains of 
divine and civil laws, which he had been developing since 1521. Luther did not openly 
oppose restoring the Aristotelian lectures, and some positive comments on Aristotle 
creep into his late works (Scheible 1996: 123; 142; 144).  
 
Luther's most important contributions to the discussion on the relationship between 
theology and philosophy during these years are to be found in his disputation theses. In 
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the Disputation on the human being (1536) Luther praises reason as the most excellent 
gift of God, even as something divine in humans. However, the Aristotelian definition 
of human as a rational animal shows, according to Luther, the feebleness of philosophy 
in providing reliable knowledge, at least in the case of human beings. In his explication 
of this main thesis Luther uses the Aristotelian fourfold scheme of causes: philosophy 
conveys some weak knowledge of the material cause of human beings and contradictory 
opinions about the formal cause, the intellectual soul. The efficient and final causes of 
human beings as creatures of God (efficient) made for eternal life (final) belong solely 
to the domain of theology (White 1994: 76-7; 80-1). 
 
Furthermore, even during the Reformation years some features of Luther's actual use of 
philosophy appear to be traceable to his early education in Aristotelianism. Luther's 
criticism of Zwingli's colored position parallels the criticism of Scotists in his early 
theology (Bolliger 2003: 426-31). However, in the late disputations Luther also openly 
attacks certain positions of the via moderna. In his Disputation on “The Word was 
Made Flesh” (1539), he maintains that the maxim every truth agrees with the truth does 
not entail that the same thing is true in different disciplines, especially in philosophy 
and theology. Luther takes as the target of his criticism the Sorbonne, which can be 
identified with theologians like John Mair from the University of Paris. In his 
Disputation on the Divinity and Humanity of Christ (1540) Luther elaborates the idea 
into semantic considerations of theological discourse as a new kind of language in a 
way that again is not completely dissimilar to the authorities of the via moderna (White 
1994: 130; 347). 
 
14 
During the early years of the Reformation Melanchthon shared Luther's harsh criticism 
of philosophy in general. As Luther, he focused on philosophy's pernicious influence on 
theology. In 1521 Melanchthon specified that not all parts of philosophy, such as 
mathematics or zoology, are harmful. According to him, Luther's criticism is targeted at 
(Aristotelian) philosophical explanations of the principles of natural philosophy, which 
he identifies with metaphysics. The criticism of metaphysics seems to be grounded in 
scepticism of natural theology. Melanchthon also shared Luther's view of the 
fundamental disagreement between Aristotelian ethics and Christian faith (Frank 2003: 
52-3). 
 
The appropriation of Aristotelian ethics was one of the main areas where Melanchthon's 
view underwent a substantial change from the late 1520s onwards. In the study reform 
of 1526, Aristotle was still in disfavor and Melanchthon substituted the Nicomachean 
Ethics with Cicero's On Duties. Nevertheless, already during next the two years he 
devoted himself to studying the Nicomachean Ethics with the intention of lecturing on it 
publicly, which resulted first in a commentary in 1529 and later in several 
commentaries and lectures on the same work. During this phase, Melanchthon began to 
consider Aristotle as the methodological ideal for teaching ethics and politics, without 
dismissing Cicero as the authority in the discussion on virtues (Kuropka 2002: 177; 276; 
286-7). 
 
The rehabilitation of Aristotle's Ethics was preceded by a rewriting of logical textbooks 
in the spirit of Aristotle (on Melanchthon's logic, see chapter ?). These were soon 
followed by an intensive study of other works by Aristotle, including his Politics, 
Physics, and On the Soul in both lectures and publications. This radical reorientation 
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was possible only through a strict demarcation being made between the domains of 
theology and philosophy. On the one hand, philosophy or philosophers – which must 
here be understood as meaning mainly Aristotelians – had nothing to say about such 
theological themes as God, or the remission of sins. Melanchthon also continued to 
point out themes where Aristotle's views collided with Christian faith. On the other, 
Melanchthon developed a basis for a Lutheran natural theology, a rational and 
argumentative method for discussing the doctrine of God. Nonetheless, Melanchthon 
highlighted Aristotle's works as ideals for teaching logic, natural philosophy, ethics and 
politics , but did not neglect the contribution of other ancient philosophers. In moral 
philosophy, Aristotle provided the general methodological framework, whereas Cicero 
remained the authority in the discussion of virtues. Although a heathen philosopher, 
Cicero was also influential in Melanchthon's natural theology, which was closely 
connected to the Stoic epistemology of natural light and inborn knowledge of the 
theoretical and practical principles (Frank 1995 esp. 17; 23-4; 112-3; 118; Kuropka 
2002: 177; 182). 
 
As the theoretical basis for a rational knowledge of God, Melanchthon proposed an 
ontological similarity between God and the human mind. Humans were originally 
created with the capability to know God, although this capability was seriously 
damaged by the Fall, resulting in uncertain and unreliable knowledge about God 
without the aid of the special revelation. However, the remaining natural knowledge  
testified to by the writings of the heathen philosophers derives from this capability 
which was part of the original constitution of a human being. Its remaining core lies in 
the natural spirit of the human, which can identify God as a spiritual and intelligent 
being. From this basic notion, philosophers have been able to conclude that God is 
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immaterial and eternal, etc. This relatively optimistic view of the possibility of gaining 
knowledge of God encouraged Melanchthon to carefully study philosophical arguments 
for apologetical purposes  (Frank 1995: 198-9; 209). 
 
Although there is little evidence of a Platonist influence on Melanchthon's philosophical 
views, some hints of the influence of Platonist philosophy independent of Ciceronian 
sources from 1530s onwards are evident. At that time Melanchthon seems to have read  
ancient Platonists such as Imblichus, Proculs, and Priscian, and his Aristotle 
interpretation shows strong affinities with the Platonist Simplicius, although a direct 
literary connection cannot be established (Salatowsky 2006: 92; 130). 
 
As for Zwingli, the influence of the Protestant Reformation, which he had fully 
endorsed by 1522, made him join in criticism of scholasticism including of his own 
Scotist background. However, the critical tones seem to have only shadowed Zwingli's 
interest in Scotist authors without completely extinguishing it. Finally, the discussion of 
the nature of the Eucharist from 1525 onwards, where Zwingli advocated the  symbolic 
view of the presence of Christ's body in the Eucharistic elements against Luther's 
rivalling realist view,  transferred this interest to a new level, enabling him to use Scotist 
metaphysics as a philosophical basis for his theological argumentation. Nonetheless, 
now in the context of the Reformation and humanism Zwingli did not highlight the 
affinities of his basic metaphysical principles with Scotism. However, when comparing 
Zwingli's early comments on the Scotists and his reformatory writings, the similarity is 
clear  (Bolliger 2003, 505-12). 
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Scotist thinking in Zwingli is mainly to be found in two doctrines: 1. The Scotist view 
of infinity, where infinity was considered as primary attribute of God and consequently 
the whole reality, norm of other divine attributes, and categorically distinguished from 
the finite and temporary nature of the creation; 2. The use of formal distinction as the 
third option between the metaphysical real and rational distinctions. Zwingli does not 
discuss these philosophical doctrines for their own sake, but uses them as tools for 
developing theological doctrines. As regards infinity, Zwingli applies Scotist theories of 
infinity mostly in the explanation of the knowledge of God and divine nature, where 
infinity serves as the primary attribute of the divine, to which other attributes such as 
eternity and omnipotence are proportioned. Particularly important for Zwingli is also 
the principle according to which there is no proportion between finite creation and the 
infinite Creator, which was an integral part of the late medieval Scotist tradition 
(Bolliger 2003, 395-423). 
 
The other core Scotist doctrine, formal distinction, appears most clearly in Zwingli's 
eucharistic controversy with Luther, where it serves to ground his interpretation of the 
expression ”This is my body” in the words of institution. The formal distinction enabled 
him to interpret the identity predication as the expression of a rational identity between 
the bread and Christ's heavenly body together with the formal presence of the body in 
the bread, which did not contradict the real non-identity and real absence. Zwingli 
applies the formal distinction here quite heavily for his own theological purposes in a 
way that is far removed from its original Scotist context. In contrast, in the theology of 




In comparison with the Wittenberg Reformers, Zwingli's relationship to philosophy has 
its own distinctive character. Zwingli was never deeply involved in reforming a 
university like Luther and Melanchthon, and perhaps this is why his career does not 
include such stages of harsh criticism and reappraisal of the philosophical heritage as 
theirs did. Nevertheless, Zwingli's use of Scotist philosophy reveals a pattern which is 
not far from the influence of the via moderna in Luther's thinking. Accordingly, the use 
of ancient philosophers (apart from Aristotle) was never so prominent in these two 
coeval Reformers as it was in the somewhat younger Calvin and Melanchthon. 
 
In Calvin, philosophy, if understood correctly, holds a high position in the service of 
theology, as it did in the humanist Christian philosophy of Melanchthon. At the 
beginning of the Institutes, Calvin defines wisdom as knowledge of God and human 
beings in a way that reflects the Stoic definition of philosophy mediated to 
contemporary humanism by Guillaume Budé, and uses the expression ”Christian 
philosophy” as a designation of his work (Partee 1977: 10; 14). However, in Calvin's 
version, human reason has a strongly instrumental role compared to that of the 
Scriptures, faith, and the illumination of the Holy Spirit, which together convey the 
correct knowledge of God and human beings. Besides, according to Calvin the reason 
for the errors among the heathen philosophers derives from their ignorance of human 
sinfulness and its implications, which are known only through the Scriptures and not by 
reasoning. Occasionally Calvin describes human reason as blind. Despite this, Calvin is 
ready to give credit to the classical philosophers regarding many issues. His view here is 
based on the idea shared with the Wittenberg Reformers that reason alone is not so blind 
that it cannot be helpful in the domain of earthly matters pertaining to government, the 
household, and so on (Partee 1977: 15; 34). 
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Concerning the natural knowledge of divine things, Calvin follows the same lines as the 
Wittenberg Reformers, especially Melanchthon. Philosophers can know that God exists, 
but cannot correctly identify what God is like. In particular, they cannot come to the 
idea through natural reason that God created the world out of nothing. However, the 
natural knowledge of God does not include only God's existence, but also that God 
should be worshipped. The specific nature of such natural knowledge of God in Calvin 
has been a subject of long-standing discussions among scholars since the dispute 
between Karl Barth and Emil Brunner in the early 20th century (Partee 1977: 44; 46-7; 
Frank 2003: 69-71). 
 
Calvin seems to have had little to do with Aristotle's philosophy. As is the case with the 
Wittenberg Reformers, some Aristotelian themes appear sporadically in Calvin's 
theology. These include the view of God as the highest good, hylomorphism, the use of 
the four causes, and Aristotelian substance metaphysics. However, usage of such 
Aristotelian elements was so common at the time that it does not reveal any 
thoroughgoing commitment to Aristotelianism vis-a-vis Luther and Melanchthon. 
However, on the basis of the fair amount of references to Aristotle there is no need to 
doubt Calvin's knowledge of Aristotle's works, even if a deeper influence is unapparent 
(Partee 1977: 97; 99). A target of Calvin's explicit criticism of Aristotle is the view of 
divine providence mediated by secondary causes, which he associates with the 
Epicurean idea of the gods' disinterest of mundane matters. Epicureans themselves serve 
in Calvin's texts as the worst of the heathen philosophers. In denying any idea of 
creation, providence, and immortality of the soul, and considering pleasure as the 
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highest good, they appear to him as ”crass despisers of piety” (Partee 1977: 99-101; 
104). 
 
However, in Plato and the Stoics Calvin found allies in building a Christian philosophy. 
In the spirit of Erasmus, Luther, and Melanchthon, Calvin praises Plato over other 
philosophers, but considers Augustine's Christian philosophy as too Platonic. Although 
Calvin may have read Plato in Latin translations, much of his knowledge and 
appreciation of Plato, as well as of other philosophers and schools of ancient philosophy, 
may have been mediated by Cicero (Partee 1977: 110-1; 117). Concerning the Stoics, 
whom he knew, in addition to Cicero, at least through reading Seneca, Calvin prefers 
their view of providence to that of the Epicureans, although he distances himself from 
their use of the term 'fate'. In fact, one can consider Calvin's view of divine providence 
and predestination of a free God as a kind of middle way between Stoic fate and 
Epicurean chance as principles governing all things. Furthermore, Calvin approves of 
the Stoic praise of nature and the (Aristotelian/Stoic) view of human beings having a 
rational and social nature (Partee 1977: 120-2). 
 
The Reformers as Philosophers 
All four Reformers occasionally commented on philosophical discussions. Among them, 
only Melanchthon appears as a professional writer and teacher of philosophy, alongside 
his career as a theologian. The reputation of Melanchthon as a philosopher has remained 
controversial mainly for two reasons. First, the nature of his philosophy was, following 
the usual character of humanist philosophy at the time, strongly influenced by various 
traditions of ancient philosophy and therefore susceptible to charges of eclecticism 
(Frank 1995: 15-6; 46-7). Among the philosophical disciplines, logic was central for 
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Melanchthon, but since Melanchthon's logic will be discussed elsewhere in this book 
(see chapter ??), what follows will concentrate on other topics. These include natural 
philosophy (and psychology as part of it), ethics, and political philosophy. 
 
As seen above, Luther's writings include various references to Aristotelian natural 
philosophy ranging from the applications of physical theories in his early writings to his 
highly polemical discussions of Aristotle's hylomorphic theory of the human soul. Only 
occasionally, as in the Heidelberg disputation, did Luther engage himself in discussions 
of natural philosophical issues, and generally it was with the intention to repudiate 
Aristotle's relevance to theology. Concerning the question of the immortality of the 
human intellectual soul, Luther remained in later years sceptical towards the 
possibilities of natural reason and philosophy. In 1532 he clearly states that Aristotle did 
not consider the soul to be immortal and that Plato did not succeed in proving it, but 
only recited the opinions of others (Salatowsky 2006: 67). 
 
But in Wittenberg it was not Luther but Melanchthon who was in charge of the 
philosophical disciplines. Several years after the reintroduction of Aristotle lectures in 
Wittenberg, Melanchthon began his publications on natural philosophy. He published 
his first textbook in this field, Commentary on the Soul in 1540, which is relatively late, 
although the first textbook on physics came out even nine years later. Nevertheless, 
Melanchthon had been preparing the publications since the early 1530s (Salatowsky 
2006: 70; 73). His dedicatory letter to the Commentary reveals that he still considered 
the work to be a short introduction and recommended to the reader three earlier treatises 
on the same subject for further reference. The three treatises are On the Soul and Life by 
Juan Luis Vives, a famous humanist, and two treatises by already departed authors: Sum 
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of Whole Physics by Jodocus Trutfetter, a scholastic philosopher from Erfurt, and 
Compendium of Natural Philosophy by his own Lutheran colleague from Wittenberg, 
Johannes Bernhardi, whose textbook on natural philosophy had been posthumously 
published in two editions, in 1537 and 1538 (Kärkkäinen 2012: 894; 896).  
 
Melanchthon's remark in the dedicatory letter shows that he was both a traditionalist and 
a reformer of psychology. In general, the work and its later edition, Liber de anima 
(1553), follow the traditional form of late medieval treatises on Aristotelian psychology, 
except for the passage on human anatomy, which Melanchthon included in the first part 
of the treatise. Regarding the contents, Melanchthon wrote in a   thematic style similar 
to his other textbooks, and made use of authors who had been less used  by others. In 
the section on human anatomy, Melanchthon uses Galen from the Greek original and 
later his contemporary, Andreas Vesalius (Salatowsky 2006: 112-3). 
 
Apart from the obvious influence of his Lutheran context, Melanchthon also adopted 
certain elements from ancient philosophy. The human soul was for him a strictly 
spiritual entity, and he was even willing to posit a distinct animal soul responsible for 
bodily functions and material movements, which he identified with Aristotle's 
entelecheia. When discussing this Melanchthon entered into a dispute with his 
colleague Vitus Amerbach about the correct rendering of entelecheia, in which he 
attempted to defend Cicero's reading of it as a ”continuous movement” rather than 
perfection. Furthermore, Melanchthon saw entelecheia as an imperfect movement 
towards the perfection of form. All this in some way underlined the distinction between 
body and soul and the provisional nature of the philosophical understanding of the 
human soul. Considering the soul essentially as a movement distinct from the body, 
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Melanchthon could avoid the Aristotelian conception of the soul as a form of the body, 
which Luther had seen as implying the soul's mortality. However, according to 
Melanchthon the philosophical definition of the soul defines only its general nature, and 
only theology brings knowledge of the nature of the immortal human soul. Theology, 
which relies on special revelation, defines the human soul as an immortal spiritual 
substance capable of understanding. Thus Melanchthon further develops  Luther's ideas 
by spiritualizing the notion of the intellectual human soul, but at the same time bringing 
the Aristotelian definition of the soul, at least nominally, into the discussion 
(Salatowsky 2006: 93-4; 103-4). 
 
Unlike Melanchthon, who wrote a treatise on psychology, Calvin is not particularly 
interested in systematically discussing the powers of the soul. However, he prefers 
Aristotle's division of the soul's faculties to Plato's, and even considers the division 
between intellect and will to be useful. As a theologian, Calvin adds to the natural 
capacities of humans the capacity to obey God, which had been lost in the fall. 
Regarding the present state of human beings, Calvin focuses on the depravity of the will 
due to original sin, and calls the depraved part of a human being, or the natural human 
being, flesh, in contrast to the spirit of man which has been regenerated by grace (Partee 
1977: 31-4; 59). According to Calvin, the initial image of God in human beings, lost in 
the fall, consisted of reason capable of discerning good and evil, the seed of religion, a 
sense of shame and guilt, and the governance of the laws (Partee 1977: 52). 
 
An important part of the epistemology of Melanchthon was the notion of permanent 
principles of knowledge. Here Melanchthon used terminology influenced by Cicero, 
and through him by the Stoic notions of common notions (koinai ennoiai) and 
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preconception (prolepsis). Melanchthon understood these permanent principles as the 
third safeguard of reliable knowledge (kriterion) in addition to sense perception and 
syllogistic reasoning. All of these belonged to the capabilities which God had given to 
humans at creation, and are accessible to all humans even in the present conditions 
tainted by original sin. The principles of knowledge consist of propositions which differ 
in the diverse fields of knowledge, such as ”cause is not subsequent to its effect” in 
natural philosophy, or ”the whole is greater than any of its parts” in geometry (Frank 
1995: 116; 166; 168). 
 
Criticism of the medieval theories of freedom of the will has been considered a hallmark 
of the Reformation. As part of his larger criticism of medieval scholastic theology, 
Luther developed the view that in matters of salvation, human will is not free to choose 
between good and evil. This led him into a dispute with Erasmus of Rotterdam, against 
whom Luther published his Bondage of the Will (1525). Luther's main position was that 
we are free to choose only as regards matters that are below us – the matters of this life 
– but not matters that are above us, namely our salvation. Occasionally Luther is ready 
to extend God's general influence to all human actions, approaching a genuinely 
deterministic view. Luther even proposed that God works through sinful human actions, 
but expressly denied that God would be the author of sin and consequently the origin of 
evil. In his argument Luther resorts to a rather excessive use of the concepts of necessity 
and predestination (Lohse 1999: 167). Calvin sees freedom of the will along the same 
general lines as Luther: the will is free only regarding external matters, which he calls 
“indifferent” (Partee 1977: 73). 
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Melanchthon developed a more nuanced view of freedom of the will. As well, 
Melanchthon saw human will as relatively free in worldly matters, but bound as regards 
God. He then discussed freedom in worldly things in connection with civil 
righteousness. On account of this freedom it is possible to demand external good works, 
which are useful even if not justifying before God. Furthermore, freedom in worldly 
matters does not automatically imply the capability for a good life even in terms of 
external works, which leads one to know one's sinfulness and to seek the grace of God. 
Concerning the role of the will with respect to God, Melanchthon held that the human 
will is not free to fulfill divine law or produce spiritually good works without the 
assistance of the Holy Spirit. However, with the aid of the Holy Spirit the will becomes 
free to perform good works before God (Wengert 2012: 188; 193-4; 206). 
 
Regarding the psychology of moral reasoning, the Wittenberg reformers gradually 
dropped the medieval concept of synderesis and articulated their views using the 
Pauline notion of conscience, which Melanchthon identifies with the total process of 
forming an ethical judgement concerning good and evil (Kärkkäinen 2012: 898). 
Luther's famous statement about the conscience bound to the Scripture, during the Diet 
of Worms (1521), has many times served as a kind of manifesto for freedom of 
conscience. The call for freedom of the conscience regarding the laws enacted by the 
Pope and the Church councils was indeed an integral part of Luther's criticism of 
ecclesiastical practices. During the Reformation, Luther, and Calvin following him, 
turned away from considering conscience as part of the process of practical reasoning. 
Instead, the function of conscience as a judge of the ethical-spiritual character of the 
whole person was emphasized. This has been seen as a further development of Scotus's 
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and Ockham's views of the close link between conscience and the virtues, and as 
anticipating later views of conscience as an independent faculty (Langston 2001: 77) 
 
As seen above, Melanchthon's revival of Aristotelianism included lectures on Aristotle's 
Ethics and Politics. Aristotle gave him the ideal of moral and political philosophy, but 
he did not dismiss Cicero either. Aristotle served as the methodological basis, whereas 
Cicero was important for the discussion of virtues. After distinguishing moral 
philosophy from theology, Melanchthon could adopt the Aristotelian teleological view 
of human life as a pursuit of happiness, which consists of virtue, although civil virtue is 
not the same as the final end of Christian life. Generally speaking, Melanchthon sharply 
distinguishes between philosophical ethics and theology, but sees no disagreement 
between them. Furthermore, Melanchthon strongly emphasizes the role of the 
authorities in society and refers to them as substitutes of God. In his commentaries on 
the Ethics, Melanchthon also discussed the ethically and theologically central concepts 
of justice/righteousness and freedom of choice (Kuropka 2002: 177-81; 188; 242-244). 
Melanchthon's moral thinking is based on the knowledge of natural law, which 
constitutes part of the natural knowledge given to human beings by the Creator (Frank 
1995: 140-158). 
 
Although Calvin is interested in ethics primarily as a Christian theologian and in the 
context of salvation, he comments on several ideas from ancient moral philosophy. He 
rejects the Stoic rule of following nature on the basis of his view of the corruption of 
nature. Contrary to this, the Stoic view on the natural sociability of humans finds 
Calvin's approval, yet supplemented with Christian pity for the suffering which 
contradicts the Stoic ideal of apathy. Interestingly, Calvin was accused by his opponents 
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of holding the Stoic doctrine of the equality of the vices because of his refusal to 
distinguish between mortal and venial sins. Calvin's answer to this accusation was that 
all sins can be mortal without being equal; they are only equal insofar as they offend the 
holiness of God and are subject to his judgment (i.e. mortal), but in other respects they 
are not equal (Partee 1977, 69-71). 
 
Calvin admits that there have been truly virtuous people among the heathens. According 
to him this is not due to their natural capacities as fallen human beings, but to God's 
grace instead. Regarding this matter, Calvin seems to posit a mode of operation in God's 
supernatural grace which creates virtuous acts without cleansing the person of original 
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